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The recent literature on cost allocation lacks consensus on what is an
appropriate de￿nition of the consistency axiom. We take this as evidence
that a careful reexamination is necessary. The starting point of our cri-
tique is the widely adopted de￿nition proposed in Moulin and Shenker
(1994), which we show to be conceptually ￿ awed. Rectifying this ￿ aw
leads to a de￿nition of consistency which already appeared in the recent
literature though without satisfactory conceptual justi￿cation. We o⁄er a
classi￿cation of the existing de￿nitions of the consistency axiom by relat-
ing them to the de￿nitions of consistency in cooperative games suggested
in Davis and Maschler (1965) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). We argue
that only the latter leads to a meaningful interpretation of consistency
when production externalities are present.
1 Introduction
The consistency axiom has been widely studied in situations where a ￿xed re-
source must be allocated between a number of individuals. These situations
include the allocation of a single private good in the presence (Young, 1987)
or absence (S￿nmez, 1994) of con￿ icting claims, the assignment of indivisible
commodities (Sasaki, 95; Ehlers and Klaus, 2005), the allocation of several com-
modities in exchange economies (Tadenuma and Thomson, 1991; Thomson and
Zhou, 1993), the problem of land division (Chambers, 2004), as well as match-
ing (Sasaki and Toda, 1992; Toda, 2006) and bargaining problems (Lensberg,
1987; Thomson and Lensberg, 1989). We refer the reader to Thomson (2006)
for a comprehensive survey of the literature on consistency in such allocation
problems. The key principle behind the axiom is that of self-similarity: an al-
location rule is consistent if the resource shares it (re-)allocates in any reduced
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1problem, formed of a subset of the original population along with its allocation
under this very rule, match the shares it allocates in the original problem (the
original shares).
Consistency is an appealing axiom for at least two reasons. From a practical
standpoint, only consistent allocation rules can actually be carried out. Indeed,
because an inconsistent allocation rule could yield a reduced problem for which
some agents receive (under the same rule) shares other than their original shares
it is not clear how it should be implemented. Some individuals will prefer that
it be applied to the original problem while others will claim that the reduced
problem is the relevant level of application. Both arguments will be legitimate.
Consistency also bears a conceptual appeal. Since allocation rules are typi-
cally decided upon because they satisfy a number of desirable properties (e.g.,
fairness, e¢ ciency, incentive compatibility), ensuring that these underlying prin-
ciples are respected when considering subsets of individuals is essential. The
consistency axiom does precisely that. In this regard, there exists an analogy
between consistent allocation rules and self-similar mathematical objects, like
fractals (see, e.g., Hutchinson, 1981), whose structure is preserved regardless
of the level of zoom. In our framework, "zooming in" amounts to considering
smaller and smaller subsets of individuals, along with their original allocation.
Some authors have also given a sequential interpretation of the consistency
axiom (e.g., Lensberg, 1987; see also Thomson, 2006, and references therein):
after a subset of agents has left the procedure with their allotted share, (re-
)applying the same (consistent) allocation rule to the reduced problem yields the
same outcome as if the allocation had been reached in a single blow. Therefore,
one could potentially save on computational complexity by treating the original
allocation problem as a succession of two-person allocation problems.
Although quite attractive, we shall show that this last interpretation is in-
appropriate when the resource to be allocated is not a ￿xed quantity, but a
production process with possibly varying returns to scale. This fact has gone
largely unnoticed in the literature on consistency in cost-allocation problems.1
Consequently, the recent cost-sharing literature su⁄ers from a lack of consensus
as to how the consistency axiom should be interpreted, or even de￿ned, thus
resulting in several di⁄erent de￿nitions for the same axiom(see our literature
review in Section 4). We take this as evidence that consistency is not a well-
understood concept in the presence of production externalities. Our aim is to
shed light on this understanding and to clarify the meaning of consistency in a
production context.
2 Cost allocation
We consider the situation where a group of individuals jointly utilize a single
production process. Each agent i demands a positive amount of consumption,
1To the best of our knowledge, only Moulin (2002) shows an understanding of why the se-
quential interpretation fails. However, Moulin and Shenker (1994) overlooks this issue entirely,
as will be discussed later.
2xi, and the total cost of meeting the vector x = (x1;:::;xn) of all demands, C(x),
must be exactly split between them. A cost-sharing problem is a triple, (N;C;x),
where N = f1;:::;ng is the set of individuals, C : RN
+ ! R a cost function and
x 2 RN
+ a demand pro￿le. We denote by ￿ the set of all cost-sharing problems.
A cost-sharing rule (or sharing rule) is a formula, ’ : ￿ ! RN, dividing the




We give three examples of prominent sharing rules of the literature on cost
allocation.
The Equal-Split Rule (ES) shares costs equally between the agents, such that
each pays C(x)=n.
Average Cost Pricing (ACP) shares costs in proportion of one￿ s demand
relative to total demand: agent i￿ s cost share equals xi P
j2N xjC(x).
The Serial Rule (SER), which has recently received much attention in the
cost-sharing literature, is characterized by many desirable properties of fairness
and incentive compatibility (see Moulin and Shenker, 1992, 1994). At its core
is the idea that all individuals demanding a given level of output are equally
responsible for the cost increment up to their joint demand level. On a three-
person example where individuals are ordered such that x1 ￿ x2 ￿ x3, and
denoting x1 = (x1;x1;x1) and x2 = (x1;x2;x2), the serial cost shares can be
written as follows:
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2[C(x2) ￿ C(x1)] + [C(x) ￿ C(x2)]
Naturally, ACP and SER make the most sense when individual demands are
expressed in comparable units and, in particular, when the cost function is
homogenous (i.e., when the total cost depends only on the total demand level).
These three rules share the common feature that they are de￿ned by sensible
normative principles: equality, proportionality and seriality. Whether or not one
deems these principles compelling is beside the point of this work. We solely
contend that each of these three rules is governed by a clear underlying logic and,
hence, should pass any meaningful test of internal coherence, which is precisely
what the consistency axiom should provide.
The starting point of our discussion will be Moulin and Shenker￿ s (1994)￿
hereafter denoted MS94￿ interpretation of the consistency axiom as it is the
most widespread and is representative of the common conceptual oversight per-
vading the literature which we intend to expose and rectify.
33 De￿ning the appropriate reduced problem
In order to de￿ne the consistency axiom, one must introduce the notion of a
reduced problem, which is the (re-)allocation problem facing a subset of individ-
uals, while ignoring the rest of the population.
We de￿ne the reduction of the cost-sharing problem (N;C;x) to coalition
S ( N to be a triple: (S;CS;xS), where xS 2 RS
+ is the restriction of x taking
only the demands of the agents in S, and CS : RS
+ ! R is a residual cost
function such that CS(xS) =
P
i2S ’i(N;C;x). Thus, the reduced problem can
be thought of as a cost-sharing problem as well. The speci￿cation of how the
residual cost function, CS, is related to the original cost function, C, is central
to our discussion. In the following de￿nition of consistency, we take such a
speci￿cation as given.
De￿nition 1 (Consistency) A sharing rule, ’, is consistent if for any cost-
sharing problem, (N;C;x), any subset S ( N, and any i 2 S the following
holds:
’i(S;CS;xS) = ’i(N;C;x).
As mentioned in the introduction, several distinct de￿nitions of the con-
sistency axiom have been proposed in the cost-sharing literature. They di⁄er
in their interpretation of what is an appropriate residual cost function. The
de￿nition of a residual cost function given in MS94 is the following:2
CS
x￿S;y￿S(zS) = C(zS;x￿S) ￿
X
i2NnS
yi for any zS 2 RS
+, (1)
where y = ’(N;C;x) is the vector of original cost shares.
The reader may have noticed that we adapted the de￿nition of MS94 to
the heterogenous-goods case. Also, their de￿nition involved a somewhat ad
hoc truncation of the residual cost function by restricting attention to its non-
negative part3. For the sake of exposition, we ignore this truncation operation
as our criticism lies at a deeper, more conceptual level. Other (equally ad
hoc) truncations have been suggested in the literature (see, e.g., Albizuri and
Zarzuelo, 2005a and 2005b); our critique applies to those as well.
At the heart of expression (1) is the idea that once the cost share of the agents
outside S has been determined, they can "put money on the table and depart
without leaving an address: the remaining division problem can be conducted
entirely without [them]." The image is from Moulin (2002) and is germane to
the sequential interpretation of consistency mentioned in the introduction.
However, the MS94 de￿nition of the consistency axiom fails our litmus test of
the previous section: according to it, ES and ACP are consistent, but SER is not
2For notational brevity, we write x￿S and y￿S instead of xNnS and yNnS.
3The same truncation also appears in Tijs and Koster (1998) and in Fleurbaey and Mani-
quet (1999)
4(see MS94). Thus, either their de￿nition, or our test, is inadequate, or both.4
Either way, our observation calls for a thorough reexamination of Expression
(1) as a de￿nition of a residual cost. We argue that it su⁄ers from a serious
conceptual ￿ aw:
On the one hand, requiring the reduced problem to be a cost-sharing problem
implies the presence of a residual cost function. In turn, this implies that what
the joint cost of the agents in S could have been￿ had they made demands other
than the ones actually observed￿ matters. Hence the dependence of the residual
cost on a vector of hypothetical demands, zS, which may di⁄er from the actual
vector of demands, xS.
On the other hand, considering the vector of cost shares for the agents outside
of the coalition, y￿S, to be solely dependent on the actual demand vector implies
that hypothetical demand pro￿les are irrelevant. Therein lies the ￿ aw: if one
wishes to compute the joint cost that agents in S should have to pay under a
given sharing rule if they demanded zS, one must acknowledge the fact that
the shares of the agents outside S might depend on this hypothetical pro￿le. In
other words, Expression (1) should be modi￿ed in the following way:
CS
x￿S;’(zS) = C(zS;x￿S) ￿
X
i2S
’i(N;C;(zS;x￿S)) for any zS 2 RS
+,
(2)
where information on the sharing rule as well as on the cost function at hypo-
thetical pro￿les is taken into account.
As it turns out, using expression (2) to construct residual cost functions
yields a formal interpretation of the consistency axiom which passes our litmus
test. I.e., ES, ACP and SER are consistent (see the Appendix). In fact, with
this de￿nition of the residual cost function, many sharing rules satisfy consis-
tency. The reader can check that sharing costs according to ￿xed proportions, to
path methods (see Friedman, 2004), dictatorial and priority rules, and two-part
pricing (in the presence of ￿xed costs) are all consistent sharing rules. Thus,
consistency is a very weak axiom, whose only role is to exclude "strange" rules,
which is precisely what we are after. For instance, a rule allocating costs ac-
cording to ES among N, but according to ACP among S when its cardinality
is odd, and according to SER when it is even, is not consistent.
Note that a di⁄erent approach altogether would be to view the production
process as consisting of two stages: production, followed by distribution. The
reduced problem would then amount to one of rationing (see Thomson, 2006,
for a short discussion). We feel that such a decomposition might go against the
very nature of the problem at hand when externalities are present (i.e., for most
cost functions).
4As it turns out, both are inadequate: our test is, in fact, too weak, as it approves of
Albizuri and Zarzuelo￿ s (2005a, 2005b) de￿nition of a reduced problem, which is guilty of the
same conceptual ￿aw as that of MS94.
54 Relation to the literature and conclusion
The consistency axiom was originally introduced in the literature on cooperative
games. The tension between two di⁄erent de￿nitions of what is a reduced game
exists there as well. In Davis and Maschler (1965), the reduced game for a
coalition considers what remains after the agents outside the coalition take their
share of the grand coalition surplus (i.e. at the actual pro￿le). Expression (1)
is clearly the cost-sharing version of that interpretation.
By contrast, Hart and Mas-Colell (in Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989, hereafter
HMC) chose to acknowledge the dependence of the shares of the "departing"
individuals on the hypothetical participation of the "remaining" agents when
de￿ning the reduced game for a coalition. Expression (2) is the cost-sharing
analog of their de￿nition.
Nevertheless, while their views di⁄er on what constitutes a reduced game,
these authors stress that the de￿nition adopted should be relevant to the partic-
ular question at hand (See HMC, and Maschler, 1990). In light of the preceding
discussion, our interpretation of their warning is that the Davis-Maschler de￿n-
ition may be appropriate for allocating a ￿xed resource but clearly is not when
production externalities are present; the HMC de￿nition is the appropriate one
in that case.
Except for the question of allocating costs, most allocation problems encoun-
tered in the literature on consistent allocation dealt with distributing a ￿xed
resource (see Thomson 2006). The consensus, in this case, is to adopt the Davis-
Maschler de￿nition of consistency. This may help explain the fact that the early
literature on consistency in cost sharing (MS94) also used the Davis-Maschler
de￿nition, perhaps out of habit.
Since then, attempts to properly de￿ne the consistency axiom in cost-sharing
problems can be sorted into two categories: those akin to the Davis-Maschler
de￿nition (e.g., MS94; Tijs and Koster, 1998; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 1999;
Albizuri and Zarzuelo, 2005a and 2005b; Koster, 2006) and those related to the
HMC de￿nition (Tijs and Koster, 19985; Friedman, 2004; McLean, Pazgal and
Sharkey, 2004)
Maurice Koster (see Koster, 2006) recently developed an intriguing axiom
related to consistency in the case where the cost function is homogenous. He
takes the view that the resource to be shared is the cost function itself and
de￿nes the residual cost function of a coalition to be the original one minus
the portion of the original cost function virtually allocated to the "departing"
agents at the original demand pro￿le (it is, therefore, a de￿nition of the Davis-
Maschler type). This de￿nition is problematic for at least two reasons. First,
it seems to incorporate a notion of responsibility of sorts, in the sense that it
aims to hold agents responsible for the increase in costs due to their presence,
5Tijs and Koster (1998) considers two di⁄erent de￿nitions of consistency, one of each
type. While the authors seem to favor the de￿nition of the HMC type, they do not provide a
satisfactory justi￿cation for their inclination. Moreover, given that subsequent work by Koster
(see Koster, 2006) reverts to a Davis-Maschler approach to consistency, one may wonder
whether the conceptual distinction between the two approaches had been clearly identi￿ed.
6which is not quite in line with the spirit of consistency. But most importantly,
it fails to recognize a sharing rule as straightforward as ES as consistent when
externalities are present.
We believe the de￿nition in Friedman (2004)￿ which exactly corresponds
to Expression (2)￿ to be most faithful to the notion of consistency6 and the
results therein to be among the most meaningful contributions to the topic of
consistency in cost sharing. Nonetheless, even Friedman failed to recognize the
large conceptual gap between his de￿nition (of the HMC type) and that of MS94
(of the Davis-Maschler type) when justifying the use of his de￿nition:
"[It] is a natural extension of the version used in [HMC] for TU
games and by [MS94] for cost sharing problems in which the cost
function is required to be homogenous."7
This serious oversight serves as further evidence that the present discussion
was necessary.
6McLean et al. (2004) uses the same de￿nition. However, their framework is less general
because they focus on setting a constant per-unit price for each agent.
7Abbreviations were added for the sake of "consistency" with the rest of the paper.
75 Appendix: Proof that ES, ACP and SER are
consistent in the HMC sense
Consider a cost-sharing problem (N;C;x) 2 ￿ as well as a coalition S ￿ N
of agents. Denote by L = NnS the set of agents who "leave" the procedure
and by (S;CS
xL;’;xS) the reduced problem of the agents in S (i.e., the agents
who "stay"), with CS
xL;’ de￿ned as in Expression (2). We shall show that
’i(S;CS
xL;’;xS) = ’i(N;C;x) for all i 2 S when ’ is ES, ACP and SER,
respectively.
5.1 Proof that ES is consistent
In this section, we let ’ ￿ ES. It is immediate from Expression (2) that the






Clearly, applying ES to the reduced problem, amounts to dividing this residual
cost by n￿jSj, which is equivalent to splitting the original cost equally between
the n agents.
5.2 Proof that ACP is consistent
In this section, we let ’ ￿ ACP. It follows from Expression (2) that the residual









This residual cost, when split proportionally to the size of the zi￿ s yields exactly
the original ACP shares when zS = xS.
5.3 Proof that SER is consistent
The consistency of SER is a corollary of a more general result in Friedman
(2004) but we provide a proof nonetheless, for the sake of self-containedness.
Also, because our proof is speci￿c to SER, it may provide the reader with a
better intuition for the result.
In this section, let ’ ￿ SER. We ￿rst introduce some notation. Let
S = (s1;:::;sjSj), and for any integer j 2 f1;:::;jSjg, we denote by x
j
S =
(xs1;:::;xsj￿1;xsj;xsj;:::;xsj), the vector of size jSj obtained by replacing the
last jSj ￿ j + 1 coordinates of xS with xsj. Without loss of generality, we shall
assume that the agents in N are ordered in increasing order of their demand
levels: x1 ￿ x2 ￿ ::: ￿ xn and that the same holds for agents in S (xsj ￿ xsj+1
for all j). To economize on notation, we shall often denote by yi = ’i(N;C;x)
agent i￿ s cost share in the original problem, and by y0
i = ’i(S;CS
xL;’;xS) her
8share in the reduced problem of coalition S. We also abuse notation slightly and
write ’S(N;C;x) =
P
i2S ’i(N;C;x) and ’L(N;C;x) =
P
i2L ’i(N;C;x).
Next, we turn to two characteristic properties of SER:


































= ’s1(N;C;x) by IHD
= ys1.
Now, ￿x i 2 S, and suppose we established that y0
sj = ysj for all j ￿ i. By














where, by budget balance, ETE and IHD, and the induction hypothesis, re-
spectively, we get CS
xL;’(x
i￿1















sk + (jSj ￿ i + 1)yi: It follows immediately that y0
si = ysi. Therefore,
SER is consistent in the HMC sense.
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